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THE 1982 JAMES McCORMICK MITCHELL LECTURE
PAST PREMISES, PRESENT FAILURES, AND FUTURE NEEDS
IN LABOR LEGISLATION
CLYDE SUMMERS*
I. PAST PREMISES OF LABOR LAW
Fifty years ago this spring, Congress passed the Norris-La
Guardia Act, one of our milestones in labor legislation.1 Although
this statute was cast in the form of defining the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, it articulated for the first time, in its statement of
purpose, the basic policy on which our labor law has since been
based. Section 2 of that statute declared:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions... the individual unorgan-
ized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to
protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and con-
ditions of employment ... it is necessary that he have full freedom of associ-
ation, self organization, and designation of representatives of his own choos-
ing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment...
These words articulated two propositions. The first proposi-
tion is the historic foundation for all labor legislation, both before
and after fNorris-La Guardia: Individual workers lack the bargain-
ing power in the labor market necessary to protect their own inter-
ests and to obtain acceptable terms of employment. When there is
* Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S., J.D., Univ. of Illinois;
J.S.D., Columbia Univ.; L.L.D., Univ. of Louvain; L.L.D., Univ. of Stockholm. This Article
was originally delivered as the 1982 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, on April 15, 1982,
at Buffalo Law School.
1. Act of March 23, 1932, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
2. See generally, J.R. COMMONS & J. B. ANDREws, PmNcwixLs oF LABOR LEGISLATjON
(4th rev. ed. 1936).
But in any modern industrial community, large numbers of unorganized workers
are found, still bargaining individually, employed at low wages and apparently
unable to make any effective efforts themselves to improve their condition. If
they are to be helped toward an equality in bargaining power with the employer,
the state must take the initiative.
Id. at 43.
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such economic inequality, it is the function of the law to protect
the weaker party.3 This was the explicit premise of legislation
fixing maximum hours of work and minimum wages, prohibiting
child labor, requiring safety and health protection, and mandating
compensation for work injuries. The law would not leave workers
to merciless market forces, but would come to their aid as the
weaker party and shield them from the dominant economic power
of the employer.
'The second proposition articulated by the Norris-La Guardia
Act was that the bargaining weakness of individual employees was
to be overcome by allowing them to organize and bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing.4 As a concrete
example, Section 3 barred employers from using their bargaining
power to extract from individual employees "yellow dog contracts"
which bound them to forego their right to organize and bargain
collectively.5
These two basic propositions-that the law should protect the
individual worker as the weaker party, and that the best protection
against individual weakness was collective action-have been the
basic premises of our labor law for fifty years.
The Norris-La Guardia Act assumed that if the law refused to
recognize "yellow dog contracts" and withheld the use of injunc-
tions, workers could, without more, form unions and establish col-
lective bargaining. This under-estimated the determination and
ability of employers to use their control over jobs, terms of em-
ployment, and the workplace to prevent unionization and block
collective bargaining. Experience soon demonstrated that the law
must provide more protection if workers were to overcome individ-
3. "In this opinion [Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)] the court recognized what
has been dimly seen or implied from the beginning of labor legislation, that inequality of
bargaining power is a justification under which the state may come to the aid of the weaker
party to the bargain .... Inequality of bargaining power has long been a ground for legis-
lative and judicial protection of the weaker party. . . ." Id. at 529.
4. "Once we recognize that the right of combination by workers is in itself a corollary to
the dogma of free competition, as a means of equalizing the factors that determine bargain-
ing power, the consequences of making the power of unions effective will be seen in truer
perspective." F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 205 (1930). In describ-
ing § 2 of the Act, the authors declared, "This pronouncement recognizes the futility of
freedom of contract in the absence of freedom to contract." Id. at 211.
5. "The whole bill flows logically from its avowed public policy. By particularization, it
aims to give that policy content and meaning. Thus Section 3 seeks to effectuate the rights
of free association and to secure genuine representation in collective bargaining." Id. at 212.
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ual weakness through collective strength.'
In the Wagner Act of 1935,7 Congress made more specific find-
ings of the social costs resulting from "inequality of bargaining
power between employees... and employers," and "the denial by
some employers of the right of employees to organize and the re-
fusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bar-
gaining." Congress explicitly declared the national policy to be one
of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing." To effectuate this policy Congress curbed the employers' use
of their control over workers and the workplace to "interfere, re-
strain or coerce employees" in their "right to self-organization...
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing."
The national policy of "encouraging the practice and proce-
dure of collective bargaining" was to serve three interlocked pur-
poses. First, and most explicitly, collective bargaining would pro-
vide a better balance of bargaining power. The workers' weakness
in individual bargaining was to be replaced by their strength in
collective bargaining. The intolerable inequality of the individual
labor market was to be remedied by creating a collective labor
market.10 There was no assumption that the collective labor mar-
ket would provide perfect parity, but rather an assurance that the
collective market would give the worker increased protection and
6. See generally, Hearing on S. Res. 266 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936-37) [commonly referred to as the La Fol-
lette Committee Hearings]; LEVINSON, I BREAK. STRIKES! (1935); HUBERMAN, THE LABOR SPY
RACKET (1937); R. BROOKS, WHEN LABOR ORGANIZES (1937).
7. Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151-168 (1976).
8. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
9. Section 1, Findings and Policy. The Wagner Act was patterned substantially on the
Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577 (with its important amendments in 1934, 48 Stat.
1185) and on experience (with Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June
16, 1933, Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195). See generally, L BERNSTEIN, NEW DEAL COLLECTIvE BARGAIN-
ING POLICY ch. 5 (1950).
10. Long ago we stated the reasons for labor organizations. We said that they
were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was
helpless in dealing with an employer; ... that union was essential to give labor-
ers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer .... Fully recognizing
the legality of collective action on the part of employees to safeguard their
proper interests, we said that Congress was not required to ignore this right but
could safeguard it.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). See also, Frey, The National
Labor Relations Act Should Not Be Amended At The Present Session of Congress, 33 ILL.
L. REV. 658 (1939).
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provide an acceptable balance of bargaining power.11
The second purpose of encouraging collective bargaining was
to provide a measure of industrial democracy and individual jus-
tice. One of the historic functions of unionization was "to intro-
duce an element of democracy into the government of industry."'
3
As the Commission on Industrial Relations of 1915 had declared,
"the struggle of labor for organization is not merely to secure an
increased measure of the material comforts of life, but is part of
the age long struggle for liberty. . . even if men were well fed they
would still struggle to be free." ' s Senator Wagner, explained the
philosophy of the Act in these terms:
The principles of my proposal were surprisingly simple. They were founded
upon the accepted facts that we must have democracy in industry as well as
in government; that democracy in industry means fair participation by those
who work in the decisions vitally affecting their lives and livelihood; and that
the workers in our great mass production industries can enjoy this participa-
tion only if allowed to organize and bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing.
14
11. For an articulate statement of the underlying philosophy of the statute, see Frey,
The Logic of Collective Bargaining and Arbitration, 12 LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 264 (1947).
12. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT on H.R. 380, 57th Cong. 1st Sess. 805
(1902). See Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 29 (1979).
13. U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 80-81 (1915).
14. M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965, at 321
(1970) (citing N.Y. TIMEs, April 13, 1937, § 1, at 20). On another occasion, Wagner declared:
Modern nations have selected one of two methods to bring order into industry.
The first is to create a supergovernment. Under such plan, labor unions are abol-
ished or become the creatures of the state. Trade associations become the cartels
of the state .... That is what is called the authoritarian state .... The sec-
ond method of coordinating industry is the democratic method. It is entirely
different from the first. Instead of control from the top it insists on control from
within. It places the primary responsibility where it belongs and asks industry
and labor to solve their mutual problems through self-government. That is in-
dustrial democracy, and upon its success depends the preservation of the Ameri-
can way of life.
The development of a partnership between industry and labor in the solution
of national problems is the indispensable complement to political democracy.
And that leads us to this all important truth; there can no more be democratic
self-government in industry without workers participating therein than there
could be democratic government in politics without workers having the right to
vote .... That is why the right to bargain collectively is at the bottom of social
justice for the workers as well as the sensible conduct of business affairs. The
denial or observance of this right means the difference between democracy and
despotism.
Keyserling, in THE WAGNER AcT. AFTER TEN YEARS 13 (L. Silverberg ed. 1945).
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The third purpose of encouraging collective bargaining was to
minimize governmental controls. Inequality in the individual labor
market cried out for legislation to protect the weaker party. The
experience of the National Recovery Act (NRA), however, had
shown the complexity of such controls,15 and the current examples
of Russia, Italy, and Germany warned of the dangers of suffocating
statism.16 The solution of the Wagner Act was to replace the indi-
vidual labor market with a collective labor market and then leave
the determination of terms and conditions of employment to mar-
ket forces. The role of the law could be limited to constructing the
collective markets; workers would obtain sufficient bargaining
power and a measure of industrial democracy, and governmental
regulation of terms and conditions of employment could be
avoided.
Focusing on the underlying premises and original purposes of
the Wagner Act provides us a valuable, and often lost, perspective
of the role of law in the labor market. The law has not been, and in
a society which values equality and individual worth, cannot be,
neutral as between employers and their employees. Nor can it
leave them to the market forces of individual bargaining. The his-
toric role of the law has been to protect the employee as the
weaker party. Nor has our declared national policy been one of
neutrality between individual bargaining and collective bargaining.
The purpose of the Wagner Act was to encourage collective bar-
gaining, not out of favoritism to unions, but in furtherance of the
law's functions of remedying inequality of bargaining power and
promoting industrial democracy. Collective bargaining was en-
couraged as a substitute for governmental control; it was a private
process constructed to serve public purposes for which the law was
15. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT Ch. 10, 11, & 12
(1935) (hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND).
16. Senator Wagner argued that the National Labor Relations Act constituted "the
only key to the problem of economic stability if we intend to rely upon democratic self-help
by industry and labor, instead of courting the pitfalls of an arbitrary or totalitarian state."
J. HUTHMACHER, SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RISE OF URBAN LIBERALISM 195
(1968). Although he pressed for the Fair Labor Standards Act, he considered it "merely the
foundation upon which can be built the mutual efforts of revived industry and a rehabili-
tated labor. To expect the government to do more would run the risk of creating a despotic
state." The major reliance must be left to private labor management relations, "worked out
on the basis of true equality of representation. 'That is why the cultivation of collective
bargaining is not merely an abstract matter of freedom for the workers,' Wagner insisted,




II. PRESENT FAILURES OF THE PREMISES
The implicit assumption of the Wagner Act was that collective
bargaining would become the dominant, if not universal, method of
determining terms and conditions of employment. The collective
labor market was substantially to supplant the individual labor
market and provide the pattern for all employment relations. Only
in this way could the purposes of the Wagner Act be fully
achieved.1
This assumption has significantly shaped our labor legislation
since the passage of the Wagner Act. Prior to that time, primary
emphasis was on protective legislation fixing boundaries to individ-
ual bargaining. From 1933 to 1935, the NRA codes sought to regu-
late wages, hours, homework, child labor, safety, and health. Sub-
sequent to 1935, reliance has been placed on collective bargaining.
To be sure the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193818 set a "floor" for
wages, but it has been a dirt cellar floor which does not provide
even poverty level subsistence. The maximum hour law does not
protect against long hours, but only requires premium pay, and the
"stretch out"19 continues with low hourly rates. The one significant
federal worker-protection law in the last forty years is the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act.2 0 No other term and condition of
employment is given legal protection.2 1 We have left worker pro-
tection to the market, with an assumption that because we have
17. See G. TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1948). Profes-
sor Taylor lamented that no consideration had been given to "gradually repealing the Wag-
ner Act as its limited purposes were achieved. Yet the Act could logically enough be viewed
as a protective tariff to help an infant industry. The protection it accorded employees in
their organizational efforts might safely have been removed as unions were organized and
permanently established." Id. at 6.
18. 54 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-18.
19. For example, in one textile dye plant, employees worked at little more than mini-
mum rates, but worked 65-80 hours per week, receiving as much as $350-400 a week gross
pay.
20. 84 Stat. 1591, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78.
21. Two significant statutes which protect rights of individual employees, but whioh do
not establish any standards for terms and conditions of employment are Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e which prohibits discrimination in
employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 832, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144. Both of these
are equally limiting on individual and collective bargains.
[Vol. 31
LABOR LEGISLATION
provided by law for collective bargaining, the market will provide
adequate protection.
Unfortunately, this assumption, implicit in the Wagner Act,
has not been realized. Fifty years after declaring a national policy
of collective bargaining, less than thirty percent of the employed
work force is covered by collective agreement.2 2 An illusion of a
flourishing system is created by the broad coverage in transporta-
tion, mining, steel and auto; but reality includes the wastelands of
the service industries, textiles, food products, printing, banking, in-
surance, and other white collar industries. Out of thirty-four indus-
try categories used by the Department of Labor, in only ten are
even a majority of workers covered by collective agreements.2 3
Ours is not a system of collective bargaining; it is predominantly
one of individual bargaining.
The implications of this uncomfortable fact are obvious. Sev-
enty percent of all employed persons are still subject to the ine-
qualities of the individual labor market. They lack the bargaining
power to protect their own interests and the law has failed to pro-
vide protection. Seventy percent of employed workers have no ef-
fective voice in determining their terms or conditions of employ-
ment and no guarantee against arbitrary treatment. For them
there is no industrial democracy; there is at best the studied be-
nevolence of modern personnel management which promises con-
sideration but grants no rights. Our national policy, relying on col-
lective bargaining rather than legislative protection, has left the
great majority of employees protected by neither.
The failure of collective bargaining to cover more than a frac-
tion of the work force is due primarily to the ugly fact that from
the beginning most employers have refused to accept the national
policy of encouraging collective bargaining. On the contrary, many
of them have bitterly resisted all efforts by employees to establish
22. The exact percentage of employed workers covered by collective agreements is un-
certain. In 1978, the total labor force was 102.5 million, with 84.5 million non-agricultural
employees. Collective agreements of unions and employee associations covered 25.1 million
employees, or 29.7% of the non-agricultural employees and 28.4% of all employees. U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL LABOR UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONS, Bull.
No. 2044 (1979) 59, 73-74. The percentage covered by collective agreements is now less, for
in 1978, 22.3% of the labor force were menbers of unions and employees associations, but in
1981 this had dropped to 20.9%. 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26 (January, 1982).




collective bargaining, and where it has been established they have
sought to undermine and eliminate it. They have pounded the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board and the courts with legal arguments
to justify their anti-collective bargaining conduct and have ex-
ploited legal rules to defeat the policy of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.2 4 When legal means have not been sufficient many em-
ployers have been prepared to break the law rather than to accept
collective bargaining.
2
Explicit in the employers' arguments and activities against un-
ions is a denial that collective bargaining serves any public pur-
pose. The election campaign is cast as a private contest between
the union and the employer, with the employer asserting his
"property rights" to bar union organizers from the plant, hold
"captive audience" speeches, and compel foremen to urge rejection
of the union. The premises of national policy are turned inside out.
The union which seeks to represent the employees is portrayed as
an intruder in the enterprise, support of the union is viewed as an
24. For descriptions of the various tactics used, including seminars on how to defeat
unions sponsored by employers associations and taught by professional labor relations con-
sulting firms, and employment of law firms who advertise their special techniques of defeat-
ing unions, along with the particular devices used to cling to the brink of claimed legality,
see Oversight Hearings on the National Labor Relations Act: Hearings before the Sub-
Comm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings]; See J. HUNT, EMPLOY-
ERS GUIDE TO LABOR RELATIONS (1979); L. JACKSON & R. LEWIS, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS,
MANAGEMENT'S STRATEGY AND PREVENTATIVE PROGRAMS (1972) [hereinafter cited as WINNING
NLRB ELECTIONS].
25. One of the most notorious systematic violators of the law is J.P. Stevens, although
others are equally deserving of such notoriety. The long chain of violations of J.P. Stevens is
set out in NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 563 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). This was the second
contempt proceeding, termed by the court "Stevens XVIII in the long list of Stevens litiga-
tion." Id. at 25. This, however, was not the end. In J.P. Stevens v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 676 (4th
Cir. 1980), the court upheld Board findings of discriminatory discharge, coercive speeches,
and retaliation against employees who filed unfair labor practice charges. The court noted
that this was "the twenty-second case in which the employer has been found guilty of unfair
labor practices." Id. at 687, n.8. And in Marshall v. Stevens People and Friends for Free-
dom, 669 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1981), the court upheld a subpoena to obtain evidence of com-
pany financial support of a group created for the purpose of persuading its employees not to
join the union, under Section 203(b) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 433 (1976). At a 1976 stockholders meeting, company officials re-
ported that fighting the union cost more than $1.3 million in back pay and lawyers fees over
a period of 15 years, but that this amount was not significant. Oversight Hearings, supra
note 24, at 193. An increase in wages of It per hour would, in the same period, cost nearly
10 times as much. See K. Kovach, J. P. Stevens And The Struggle for Unionization, 29
LAB. L.J. 300 (1978).
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act of disloyalty, and the bargaining process is described as an un-
necessary burden. The employer's opposition to the union is
presented not only as an expression of his self-interest, but also an
expression of the employees' interest and the public interest.
26
The adamant refusal by employers to accept collective bar-
gaining has bent the National Labor Relations Act from its original
premises and purposes. Legal arguments cast in terms of balancing
the interests of the union and the employer have caused the Board
and the courts to view themselves as mere referees and to ignore
the national policy of encouraging the practices and procedures of
collective bargaining. Private claims for the primacy of "property
rights" and "management prerogatives" have overriden the social
claims for equality of bargaining power, providing industrial de-
mocracy, and guaranteeing individual justice. Employers, acting as
self-appointed surrogates of individual rights, have misappropri-
ated those rights for their own benefit to defeat collective bargain-
ing and deprive employees of individual rights. The end result is
that the legal rules developed by the Board and the courts do not
express or implement the premises and purposes of the statute.
Our labor law today is not one which encourages the practices and
procedures of collective bargaining; it is at best one of declared
indifference.
The indifference of the law is matched by an indifference, if
not hostility, in public attitudes, shaped in large measure by the
employers' unremitting campaign at the workplace, in the public
press, and in the legislative halls. Large sectors of the public see
only the costs and inconvenience of collective bargaining, and
many employees are persuaded that for them unionization is inap-
propriate or that they would fare better without a union than with
one. We no longer have a strong and articulate public commitment
to collective bargaining which will provide a hospitable climate for
its extension.
26. The book by JACKSON & LEwIs, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS, supra note 24, states as
its purpose to explain to lawyers and their client employers, "how the client may best reach
his objective of remaining unorganized." Id. at 1. The election is described as "a contest for
the allegiance of employees," and an employer is told he "can take pride" that his employ-
ees are not represented by the union. Id. at 2. The employer is advised to hold "captive
audience" speeches, but not answer questions of employees at the meeting, and the union
should not be allowed to reply or debate. Id. at 42. Individual employees should be told
about benefits to "remind the employee of what he often takes for granted." Id. at 46. Su-
pervisors should be required to aid the employer in opposing the union. Id. at 49 et seq.
1982]
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Whatever may be the reasons, the stubborn fact remains that
only thirty percent of the employed work force is covered by col-
lective agreements. The assumptions on which our labor law have
been based for half a century have not been realized and its pur-
poses have not been fulfilled.
III. FUTURE NEEDS
Our present failure measures our future needs. The most
pressing question in labor law and labor legislation is not how we
shall improve the processes of collective bargaining, much as that
may be needed. The important questions are not ones of arbi-
trability of grievances, enforceability of no-strike clauses, or appli-
cability of anti-trust law to unions-all intriguing and challenging.
Even the fundamental question of what are bargainable subjects,
which defines the reach of industrial democracy, is relevant only to
those who bargain collectively. The most pressing and difficult
question for labor law is what we shall do for the seventy percent
of employees who are not now covered by collective agreements.
How shall we protect them from the helplessness of unequal bar-
gaining power? How shall we provide them a process of industrial
democracy? How shall we guarantee them against arbitrary treat-
ment which denies their human dignity? This is the problem which
we have too long ignored and must now confront.
Before turning to substantive suggestions, I want to venture a
word about the role of law schools and labor law teachers in devel-
oping labor law. I have no illusions that as teachers or scholars we
make much law. Students forget most of what we teach long before
they confront a specific problem in practice and most judges find
our preachments less persuasive than ill-considered precedents.
But the problems we treat as important in law school become those
the students will see as important when they become lawyers. The
questions we ask our students are the ones our graduates will con-
sider worth answering. What we write may illuminate issues when
precedents are not yet born or deserve to die.
The problems we have pursued, the questions we have asked,
and the issues we have illuminated are almost exclusively related
to the collective bargaining process.2 We have largely treated the
27. See, e.g., A. Cox, D. BOK, R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW (9th ed.
1981); J. GETMAN, LABOR RELATIONS LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY (1978); D. LESLIE, CASES AND
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problems of seventy percent of the work force as if they did not
exist.2 Is it not time for us to develop new courses for the needs of
the majority? Is it not time for us to devote at least a portion of
our time to confronting the problem of what should be done for
those who have not been reached by collective bargaining?
My purpose here is not to produce answers or even to submit
an agenda. My very limited purpose is to open discussion. To that
end, I would like to suggest three lines along which we might work,
lines which are not mutually exclusive but which can be pursued
simultaneously. First, we should reshape the National Labor Rela-
tions Act so as to effectuate the policy of encouraging collective
bargaining and thereby extend collective bargaining. Second,
where collective bargaining does not exist, we should provide for
other systems of worker representation. Third, we should extend
by law to all employees some of the basic rights which have be-
come commonly accepted in collective bargaining.
A. Extending Collective Bargaining
Although collective bargaining may never become the domi-
nant characteristic of our labor market, we should seek to bring as
many employees as possible under its protective cover. Whatever
its present inadequacies, it provides those covered with more
nearly equal bargaining power, a significant measure of industrial
democracy, and more protection of individual rights. Nor does ex-
tension of collective bargaining preclude pursuit of other methods
in areas collective bargaining has not reached.
How might the law better extend collective bargaining? The
potential measures are multitudinous; some might be effectuated
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW (1979); B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
(2d ed. 1977); W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE, J. ANDERSEN, LABOR LAW, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN A FREE SOCIETY (2d ed. 1979); R. SMITH, L. MERRIPIELD, T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 1979); C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON, A. HYDE, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW (2d ed. 1982).
28. Apart from casebooks on employment discrimination, there are few current pub-
lished teaching materials which deal with the individual employment relation. One excep-
tion is W. MALONE, M. PLANT, J. LITTLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS (2d ed. 1980). In 1957, the Labor Law Group published
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW (Aaron ed. 1957). In the 1970s, the Group developed
an eleven unit set of materials to cover a broad range of topics. One unit was devoted to
employment discrimination. Apart from this there were 20 pages in Unit 9, dealing with
rights of unorganized employees. See LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS, INDIVIDUALS
AND THE UNION (Dunsford, Alleyne & Morris eds. 1973).
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by the Board and the courts, and others might require legislation
such as the aborted Labor Reform Act of 1978.29 The fundamental
need, however, is to reaffirm the declared purpose of the National
Labor Relations Act to "encourage the practices and procedures of
collective bargaining," and to keep in the forefront the premise
that collective bargaining serves important social purposes. This
requires recognition that many employers will use all the resources
at their command to defeat the statutory purpose, and the law
must be adequate to meet this challenge. Viewed from this per-
spective, legal issues take on a different shape. A few examples are
suggestive.
In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox,30 the Supreme Court held that
an employer could prohibit a union organizer from distributing
literature in the plant parking lot, even though that distribution in
no way interfered with production or plant security. The em-
ployer's property right to exclude non-employees outweighed the
employees' right to organize in circumstances where the union had
other methods of reaching the employees. The effect was to permit
the employer to use his control of the plant premises to defeat the
purposes of the statute.
The Board and the courts have recognized that the most ap-
propriate place to discuss organization and solicit union member-
ship is the workplace. Experience has made clear that, because of
employer hostility, employees are often fearful of revealing their
union sympathies, particularly in the beginning stages of organiza-
tion. The use of outside organizers is, therefore, imperative if col-
lective bargaining is to be achieved, and initial contact at the
workplace is the only efficient method of developing an organiza-
tional core. When we view this problem from the perspective of the
statutory purpose of encouraging collective bargaining, the public
interest in giving union organizers access to the plant premises is
29. The Labor Reform Bill is particularly suggestive, for its purpose was to make possi-
ble the extension of collective bargaining by removing some of the obstacles to union organi-
zation, to give unions increased ability to campaign before representation elections, and to
provide more effective sanctions for employer violations of the Act. See generally, Labor
Reform Act of 1977, Hearings on H.R. 8410, Before the Sub-Comm. on Labor Management
Relations of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Hearings on
S. 1883 Before the Sub-Comm. on Labor of the Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977). See also Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech
and Equal Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 755 (1979).
30. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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substantial and the encroachment on the employers' property in-
terest is minimal. The legitimate concerns for productivity, plant
discipline, and security can be met by limiting the time and place
of access.
Similarly, in Livingston Shirt,31 the Board held that an em-
ployer could engage in "captive audience" speeches without giving
the union equal time to address the employees. Again, the em-
ployer was allowed to use his control of the employees' work time
and work place to discourage unionization. The employer, of
course, must be free to state his views. Further, the employer can
bar all discussion of organization and all solicitation for or against
the union during working time. But if the employer decides that
the issue of organization is of such importance that it should be
discussed on working time, he ought not to be able to use his eco-
nomic control over the employees to decide what they shall hear.
This reinforces the employees' awareness of the employer's domi-
nant position and his willingness to use his economic control to
discourage and defeat collective bargaining. If the Board and the
courts had focused on the purpose of the statute, they would have
reached a different result in Livingston Shirt.
Not only the substantive rules but the remedies should be re-
shaped to implement the policy of encouraging collective bargain-
ing. This policy is now frustrated by employers' tactics of intermi-
nable delay, which not only postpones bargaining, but often totally
defeats it. In Darlington,3 2 where a plant was closed for the very
purpose of preventing bargaining, the case was settled only after
twenty-six years of litigation. A third of the discharged employees
were dead, most of the rest retired, and the union leader was
eighty years old.33 Board remedies too seldom give birth to collec-
tive bargaining and too often place a tombstone on its grave.
When there is reasonable cause to believe that an employer is
illegally opposing the establishment of collective bargaining, the
policy of the statute warrants, if not requires, a temporary injunc-
tion against continued violations. When a union uses secondary
pressure or organizational picketing, the statute mandates a tem-
porary injunction. The establishment of collective bargaining is
31. Livingston Shirt Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
32. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
33. For a history of the litigation, see Eames, The History of The Litigation of Darling-
ton As An Exercise in Administrative Procedure, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 595 (1974).
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certainly no less worthy of timely protection against employer co-
ercion, discriminatory discharge, and deliberate refusals to bargain
in good faith. Enjoining employer violations would place no signifi-
cant burden on an employer, for it would require only that he
cease violating the law and defeating the purposes of the statute.
The need for reshaping remedies is illustrated even more
clearly in H. K. Porter.34 After the union had won an election the
employer dragged out bargaining for five years, twice being found
guilty of refusing to bargain in good faith. The second time the
employer was found to have refused the union's request for a
checkoff "solely to frustrate the making of any collective bargain-
ing agreement." The Supreme Court held that this deliberate frus-
tration of bargaining could not be remedied by ordering the em-
ployer to grant the checkoff in return for some reasonable
concession.
The basic purpose of the statute to establish a system of col-
lective agreements was set aside by denying that the statute au-
thorized the only remedy which would achieve its purpose. The
statutory mandate to recognize the union and bargain in good faith
was made empty words by invoking the verbiage of "free collective
bargaining" to shield a defiant employer whose bargaining was
designed to discredit the union and make reaching an agreement
impossible.
Similarly, where employers have engaged in frivolous appeals
from representation elections and orders to bargain for the purpose
of postponing bargaining, they have been allowed to profit from
their deliberate frustration of the statute. When the employer en-
gages in such tactics, he should be ordered to pay at least a portion
of any increase in wages or other benefit he predictably would have
paid if he had complied with the national policy, accepted collec-
tive bargaining, and bargained in good faith.35 Such a remedy
34. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). The Supreme Court's statement of
the facts glosses over the employer's illegal activities by attributing the eight years of delay
to "the skill of the company's negotiators in taking advantage of every opportunity of de-
lay." Id. at 100. The "skill" consisted of committing multiple violations, refusing to comply
with Board orders so as to require an enforcement order by the Court of Appeals, and then
continuing its illegal bargaining tactics so as to require new Board proceedings. Id. at 107.
35. See Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972); modified I.U.E. v. NLRB, 502
F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Morris, The Role of the NLRB and The Courts in The Collective
Bargaining Process; A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom and Unconventional Remedies,
30 VAND. L. REV. 661 (1977); Dell, The Use of Section 10(J) of the Labor Management
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would not only make the employees whole, but it would "effectuate
the policies of [the Act]""6 by furthering the establishment of col-
lective bargaining.
These modest changes could be achieved without legislation if
the Board and the courts gave full weight to the purpose of the
statute and did not feel imprisoned by their precedents. Other
changes not within the words of the statute would help fulfill its
purposes. For example, the protection of the statute could be ex-
tended to supervisors who presently, in defiance of plain fact, are
defined as non-employees. Supervisors have the same need for col-
lective bargaining as other employees-as individuals they lack the
bargaining power to protect their interests, they have the same
claim to participate in industrial democracy, and they are entitled
to the same basic rights. To be sure, they owe a duty of loyalty to
the employer, but so do all employees; and collective bargaining is
not an act of disloyalty. Their special relation to other employees
can be accommodated by requiring that they be represented
through separate unions, as are plant guards. Almost every other
country recognizes that supervisors should have the same right to
bargain collectively as other employees. 7 Our system would be bet-
ter served if supervisors were recognized as employees with rights
instead of relegating them to the status of servile pawns of
employers.
These are but a few suggestive examples of how the law might
be reshaped to extend collective bargaining. Many others will be-
come apparent when we view the law from the perspective of its
role in establishing a system of collective bargaining to serve the
public purpose.
B. Alternative Forms of Representation
While seeking to extend collective bargaining, we should si-
Relations Act in Employer Refusal-to-Bargain Cases, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 845.
36. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
37. In Sweden, for example, supervisors have the same protected right of association as
other employees, but the employer can require that they not be members of the union rep-
resenting those employees being supervised. In practice, the supervisors have their own na-
tional union. See F. SCHMIDT, LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 75-77 (1977). In
France and Germany, supervisors may be members of the same unions as the employees
they supervise. See Despaux & Rojot, France 180, and Ramm, Federal Republic of Ger-
many 151, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
(Blanpain ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA].
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multaneously seek to devise alternative forms of representation
where collective bargaining does not exist. These should not be
conceived of as substitutes for full collective bargaining, nor should
they be allowed to serve as obstacles to extending collective bar-
gaining. On the contrary, they should be acknowledged as second
best solutions and should be designed to facilitate transition to full
collective bargaining.
Here we must break the bonds of habitual thinking, for we
have long insisted that the Wagner Act model is the only legiti-
mate form of representation. Other countries, however, have other
models as a part of, or parallel to, their systems of collective bar-
gaining. These may stir our imagination to see new forms suitable
for our special needs, though they may at first seem foreign to our
thinking. I would suggest three possibilities worth exploring.
1. Representation by a minority union. The first possibility is
to simply graft onto our present system a requirement that, in the
absence of a majority representative, the employer bargain with
any union which has substantial support as a representative of its
members. This would in no way encroach on the exclusive repre-
sentation status of a majority union, for it would impose a duty to
bargain with a minority union only when there was no majority
union. "Members only" contracts have always been permissible
under the statute in the absence of a majority representative; the
proposal is to make them an integral intermediate step.
The majority rule principle has its statutory origin in the Rail-
way Labor Act.3 8 Its function was not to determine whether there
would be collective bargaining-that was assumed by the statute.
Indeed, ballots in representation elections under the Act do not
include a choice of "No Union."3 If a majority of employees vote,
the winning union is certified. 40 The purpose of majority rule was
only to avoid multiple or proportional representation by designat-
ing an exclusive representative.
Majority rule was carried over into the Wagner Act to serve
the same purpose. Experience under the NRA had shown that em-
38. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1976).
39. Brotherhood of R.R. & S.S. Clerks v. Ass'n for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees,
380 U.S. 650, 658 (1965).
40. A failure to vote is treated as a vote against representation. If a majority of eligible
employees fails to vote, then no union is certified. If a majority votes, then the union with
the most votes is certified. Id. at 671.
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ployers could manipulate plural representation to play unions
against each other to avoid reaching an agreement. To bargain
most effectively, employees needed a single representative and that
representative should be selected by majority rule.41
The fact that some employees, or even a majority, prefer indi-
vidual bargaining ought not to reduce the rights of others to bar-
gain collectively for themselves through representatives of their
own choosing. The purpose of majority rule was to facilitate collec-
tive bargaining, not frustrate it. The minority has always had the
right to engage in concerted activity, including striking, to compel
bargaining until a majority selected an exclusive representative.
What is lacking is recognition of an affirmative obligation of the
employer "to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith"
42
with representatives of minority groups. The proposal is simply to
make explicit that affirmative obligation.43
Requiring an employer to bargain with a minority union for its
own members presents unfamiliar problems, but none beyond the
reach of practical solution. In other countries, bargaining with mi-
nority unions is commonplace, and in Sweden and Britain is legally
required." The most obvious problem is determining the amount
of support which the union must show before the employer must
meet and bargain with it. The British solution is to require "ade-
quate" support and leave the question of what is "adequate" to
administrative determination.4 5 The relevant test could be whether
41. Houde Engineering Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. (old) 87 (1934); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND,
supra note 15, at 241-45.
42. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
43. The words of section.8(a)(5) could be interpreted to require bargaining with a mi-
nority union, subject to the existence of a majority union which, under section 9(a), would
have exclusive bargaining rights. In the early days of the Wagner Act, it was argued that the
statute imposed the duty to bargain with minority unions. See Latham, Legislative Purpose
and Administrative Policy Under the National Labor Relations Act, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
433, 452-54 (1936). The Board apparently never tried to enforce such a duty.
44. In Sweden the employer is required to negotiate with any union which has any
members employed by the employer. LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN, supra note
37, at 102. In Great Britain the employer is required to recognize and negotiate with unions
recommended by the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Services (ACAS). The statutory
criterion for recognition is, "promoting the improvement of industrial relations and in par-
ticular of encouraging the extension of collective bargaining and the development and where
necessary, reform of collective bargaining structures." P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, LABOUR
LAW, TEXT AND MATERIALS (1979) 66-70.
45. The test applied by ACAS is whether there was evidence of adequate support
within a group of workers to sustain effective collective bargaining by the union making the
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the union had enough members to justify burdening the employer
with the costs of meeting and bargaining with the union. This
could be decided by the NLRB at the regional level with the aid of
mechanical rules developed by experience. There would be no need
to define an appropriate unit. The employees, by joining the union,
would have declared their common interest. Those who have not
joined will not be bound; they can choose another union or bargain
individually.
A second problem arising from requiring employers to bargain
with minority unions is prescribing the subjects of bargaining. It
would seem that all mandatory subjects would be presumptively
appropriate, but no agreement reached could legally bind non-
members. This would limit the iiaking of binding seniority clauses
or other relative rights provisions, but it would not preclude nego-
tiating on those subjects and finding mutually satisfactory solu-
tions. The duty to meet at reasonable times, the duty to provide
information, the conduct required at the bargaining table, and the
duty to put in writing any agreement reached would be the same
as in bargaining with a majority union. The duty would be to bar-
gain in good faith.
What would be gained by representation through a minority
union? Of course, a minority union bargaining for members only
would have less bargaining strength than a majority union with ex-
clusive representation status, but the minority union would have
much more bargaining strength than an individual employee. It
could speak for its members, making their voices heard, however
weakly, providing for them the form and some of the substance of
industrial democracy.46 Though the concessions it would win might
be small, the collective agreement would substitute enforceable
rules for employer arbitrariness and its grievance procedure would
provide a system for enforcing those rules and representing em-
ployees in day-to-day problems. Bargaining by a minority union
would provide in smaller measure many of the same values as bar-
gaining by a majority union.
reference. Id. at 71-73.
46. The practical situation of a minority union may not be significantly different from
that of many certified unions where the bargaining unit is for only a minor segment of the
work force in the enterprise. A number of minority unions, each bargaining for members




Beyond these values, requiring the employer to recognize and
deal with a minority union would give the union a presence and
status in the plant. As a recognized representative of employees, it
could not be dismissed as an officious outsider. More important,
election campaigns would take on different significance, for there
would be collective bargaining both before and after the election,
regardless of the outcome. The function of the election would not
be to determine whether there should be collective bargaining, but
only whether one union should become the exclusive representa-
tive. As a result, the employer's interest in campaigning against the
union, and the effects of employer opposition, would be signifi-
cantly reduced.
It is difficult to foresee in detail how such a combined system
of members only and exclusive representation bargaining might
evolve. But requiring employers to bargain with minority unions
could provide a useful form of employee representation where no
union has acquired a majority. It would not obstruct, but would
facilitate, movement toward full collective bargaining through an
exclusive representative. It is a possibility which I believe deserves
serious study.
2. Statutory safety committeee. The Occupational Safety and
Health Act4V 7 offers an opportunity for a more limited, but desper-
ately needed, form of representation. This Act presently provides a
wide range of functions for an "organization of employees" or "rep-
resentative of employees" in the enforcement of the statute. This
includes filing requests for standards,48 initiating inspections,49 ac-
companying the inspector on his walk around the premises,50 chal-
lenging the abatement period,51 or bringing mandamus to compel
the Secretary of Labor to enjoin imminent dangers. 52 These provi-
sions, written into the statute on the insistence of unions, serve the
dual purpose of giving employees an active voice in safety and
health matters and policing compliance with the statute at the
workplace.
Where employees are represented by the union, these provi-
47. 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976).
48. § 6(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1).
49. § 6(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657.
50. § 6(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(e).
51. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).
52. § 13(d), 29 U.S.C. § 662(d).
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sions can serve their purposes. But in the majority of workplaces
there is no union representative and the statute makes no provi-
sion for designating representatives." Employees are left without
any representation in these life and death matters of health and
safety, and policing is left to infrequent inspections and individual
complaints.
To achieve the dual purpose of the statute, we might follow
the lead of Western European countries and statutorily require the
establishment of safety committees in work places where there is
no union representative.5 4 The experience of the European coun-
tries suggests some of the necessary elements if such committees
are to be effective. The members of the committee must be elected
by the employees, for their function is to represent the employees
in all safety and health matters. Committee members must be
given reasonable time off from work, with pay, to make inspec-
tions, investigate complaints, discuss safety and health problems
with the employer, and carry on other work of the committee.
They must be provided necessary office facilities, administrative
support, and research resources. And they must be given technical
and practical training, on paid time, in order to enable them to
perform their safety work with competence. The costs of the safety
committee should be borne by the employer, for its work is as
much a cost of production as safety equipment, accident preven-
tion programs, or workmen's compensation. Finally, members of
the safety committee must be guaranteed that they will not be dis-
criminated against because of their activities on the committee and
that they will not be denied promotions or other benefits because
53. The Department of Labor has proposed regulations for the voluntary creation of
employee participation programs to help achieve the purposes of the statute. See 47 Fed.
Reg. 2796-2801. January 19, 1982. The voluntary programs suggested include no provision
for their being created on the initiative of the employees, no provision as to how the em-
ployee members are to be chosen, no suggestion that representation of management and
employees would be equal, and no requirement that employees be allowed paid time for
their work.
54. In Sweden, the Working Environment Act of 1977 requires that a safety representa-
tive be elected in every workplace employing five or more employes, and a safety committee
be elected in every workplace employing more than fifty employees. See generally, DANIEL-
SON, WORK ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION, STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE IN SWEDEN
(1980). In Belgium, worker safety committees are mandated by statute in establishments of
more than fifty employees. Blanpain, Belgium 169, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, Supra
note 37. In Western Germany, the statutorily created works councils have authority and
responsibiity in safety matters. Ramm, Federal Republic of Germany 183, in id.
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of time they devote to safety work.
The functions of the safety committee would include all those
now provided in the statute for a "representative of employees,"
but it could include much more. Perhaps most important, the com-
mittee should have the authority to order suspension of work
where there are immediate and serious dangers to life or
health-an authority long exercised by union safety committees in
the coal mines. Following the Swedish model, the committee's
functions might include negotiating standards in addition to those
in the statute, supervising safety measures, and participating in
the planning of new premises, appliances, or work processes. The
scope of their concern could be broadened, as in Sweden, to en-
compass all aspects of the work environment, whether creating
risks to safety and health or not.55
The value of statutory safety committees is self-evident; they
would provide a structure of employee representation where none
now exists. Of course, committees would not be established in
every workplace, many would be moribund and few would be as
effective as committees established by collective bargaining. But
where safety and health problems are substantial, and where em-
ployees felt a need for representation, a structure would be availa-
ble. Safety committees would not encroach on collective bargain-
ing; instead they would provide unions a point of entry for
organization and an avenue leading toward full collective
bargaining.
3. Statutory works councils. Safety and health is but one con-
dition of employment and safety committees are only a piecemeal
alternative form of representation. Again, forms of employee repre-
sentation in Western Europe are suggestive; we could consider pro-
viding by law for the establishment of works councils to represent
employees more broadly concerning terms and conditions of em-
ployment where there is no majority union. 6 The elements neces-
sary for safety committees would be equally essential for works
councils-election by the employees, time off for conducting works
council affairs, provision for training, and protection of works
council members. The functions of works councils could be legally
defined in terms paralleling the functions of a majority union
55. See DANIELSON, supra note 54.
56. W. KOLVENBACH, EMPLOYEE COUNCILS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES (1978).
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under the National Labor Relations Act. Constructing a works
council system would obviously present many problems, but there
is a variety of working models to provide guides in working out a
solution suited to our special situation.
Works councils cannot, of course, be full substitutes'for collec-
tive bargaining. Their confinement to a single enterprise and their
lack of outside support severely limit their bargaining power. They
are not intended, however, as an alternative to representation by a
union, but as an alternative to no representation at all. Their bar-
gaining power, while less than that of a union representative, is
still greater than that of the individual employees. There are obvi-
ous dangers of employer domination, but these can be largely elim-
inated where the works councils are statutorily created and their
financial support is statutorily required. The works council would
not be dependent on the employer for existence, but would have
legal rights against the employer to secure its operation.
Works councils can be constructed so as not to block unioniza-
tion and collective bargaining. In Germany, works councils have
the right to consult union representatives and invite them to at-
tend council meetings.57 Unions actively participate in works coun-
cil elections and works council members are often union mem-
bers.58 Within our system, works councils would provide the
training ground and building blocks for union organization. When
the employees found the works council inadequate they would rec-
ognize the advantages of having a union; and when the union ob-
tained a majority, it could absorb or supplant the works council.
There are, no doubt, a variety of other forms of representation
which we might devise if we let our minds run free. My purpose
here is not to plead for any specific proposals, but rather to urge
that we cease being prisoners of our parochialism and search for
new forms of representation to serve that seventy percent of em-
ployees who have too long been left unrepresented. My proposals
are intended only to suggest that the search need not be in vain.
57. Ramm, Federal Republic of Germany 186-87, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 37.
58. Summers, Worker Participation in U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study
From An American Perspective, 28 AmER. J. Comp. L. 367, 389-90 (1980).
[Vol. 31
LABOR LEGISLATION
C. Legislative Guarantee of Basic Rights and Benefits
Despite our best efforts to extend collective bargaining and
despite our greatest ingenuity in creating new forms of representa-
tion, many employees will remain without the bargaining power to
protect their interest. For them, labor legislation should meet its
hist6rical responsibility of protecting the weaker party by guaran-
teeing certain basic rights.
The threshold question is what rights and benefits are to be
guaranteed, for the law cannot prescribe the entire employment
contract. The beginning benchmark should be those rights and
benefits which have become broadly accepted in collective agree-
ments. Their acceptance in collective bargaining evidences their
importance to employees, their feasibility for employers, and a
common recognition that their value to employees is greater than
their cost to the employer. This benchmark further focuses on re-
ducing the inequality between those covered by collective agree-
ments and those not covered. The following rights and benefits are
ones, other than wages, which I consider have prior claim to legis-
lative protection.
1. Right to fairness in dismissals. The most fundamental em-
ployee right needing protection, apart from the right to a safe and
healthy workplace, which has been recognized at least nominally
by the law, is the right not to be dismissed except for just cause.
This right has long been recognized by almost every collective
agreement. Unions insist on it as non-negotiable and employers ac-
cept it as inevitable, for it is worth far more to employees than any
trade-off the employer will offer. In spite of this demonstrated
value and practicality of protection, the majority of employees
work under the Damoclean common law rule that they can be dis-
charged at any time with no reason and without notice.59
We should prohibit by law discharge without just cause, giving
all employees substantially the same protection enjoyed by those
covered by collective agreements. Almost every other democratic
country recognizes this as a basic right and provides legal protec-
59. See Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967). For recent softening around
the edges of this procrustean doctrine, see Comment, Protecting At Will Employees against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HAV. L. RE V. 1816




tion. We are much more able to design protective measures than
other countries were when they enacted their statutes, for we have
developed standards and procedures through our experience with
arbitration under collective agreements which can provide guides
for statutory protection. Indeed, we can build directly on our ex-
isting system of arbitration to give all employees protection. There
is no need to spell out here how this may be done; that has been
done elsewhere and I believe that a practical solution is readily at
hand."
A necessary corollary of the right not to be unjustly discharged
is the right not to be arbitrarily selected for layoff. Under our col-
lective agreements, layoffs are governed by seniority. In other
countries, factors such as age, economic need, and family status are
used."' The law need not impose on the employer any particular
standard, for the protection required is only from arbitrary action.
The law need only require the employer to apply a standard which
is relevant, capable of objective measurement, and stated in ad-
vance. Effective protection of this right presents no insuperable
problems.
There are two subsidiary rights not generally recognized by
collective agreements which deserve our consideration. One is the
right to reasonable notice of termination so that an employee is
not put out on the street without warning.6 2 Every other demo-
cratic country has such a notice requirement; in England it devel-
oped as a common law rule. The notice period is often related to
the length of service and the type of work, and may vary from one
week to more than a year. In this country customs of notice are
observed, particularly as to white collar employees; and for a fa-
vored few, such as college professors, a full year's notice may be
required by the institution's rules. The need is for legislation which
will give all employees a legally enforcible right to a definite period
of notice.
The other right worth considering is the right of every em-
60. See Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for A Stat-
ute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
61. See Despaux & Rojot, France 110, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 37;
Ramm, Federal Republic of Germany, 137, in id.; Trev, Italy, 84, in id.
62. See, e.g., Blanpain, Belgium 95-99, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 37,
Despaux & Rojot, France 94-96, in id.; Ramm, Federal Republic of Germany 133-35 in id.
63. P. DAvIEs & M. FREEDLAND, supra note 44, at 329-31.
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ployee who is terminated to a letter stating the reasons for termi-
nation. In a discharge for cause, this would prevent the employer
from relying on post hoc justifications. In other terminations, it
would aid the employee in obtaining another job.
2. The right to relief from work. Among the common provi-
sions in collective agreements are those granting paid vacations,
paid holidays, and paid sick leave; and many employers not bound
by collective agreements provide similar benefits. But there are a
substantial number of workers for whom the only vacation is un-
employment, holidays are a loss of a day's pay, and sickness brings
doctor bills and empty pay envelopes. These workers are predomi-
nantly those who do the most burdensome work, receive the lowest
pay, and struggle from payday to payday. They are the ones who
most need relief from work without loss of pay.
In most European countries these rights are provided by stat-
ute for all employees, from cleaning women and taxi cab drivers to
insurance salesmen and engineers. 5 The statutes do not preclude
unions from bargaining for more or employers from granting more,
and such bargaining is customary. But the pattern of collective
agreements provides guides for the statutory benefits. Thus, when
the statutory vacation was two weeks, unions increasingly bar-
gained for three weeks. And when the pattern of collective agree-
ments became three weeks, the statutory vacation was raised to
three weeks, and some unions then bargained for four weeks. It is
time that we in this country consider developing similar legislation,
both as a matter of equity and as a matter of recognizing a basic
human need.
There is a similar, and even more pressing, need to protect
workers from excessively long work days and work weeks. The re-
quirement of time-and-a-half for hours over forty per week does
not necessarily discourge oppressive work schedules, but may only
lower the hourly base rate. Workers may still be required to work
sixty or seventy hours a week where there is no union to protect
them. We should consider following the European example of sup-
plementing our present time-and-a-half requirement with fixed
maximums on the number of hours an employee could be asked to
64. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.140 (Vernon 1965) which requires corporate employ-
ers to provide employees who are terminated a letter of dismissal.
65. See, e.g., Belgium 77, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA supra note 37; France 75-76,




3. The right to a safe and healthy workplace. The elemental
individual right to physical integrity is not now adequately pro-
tected, either by collective agreements or by legislation. One ave-
nue for giving greater protection is to recognize that violations of
health and safety standards are more than violations of public law;
they are violations of individual rights. For example, employees
who suffer industrial disease or injury because of an employer's vi-
olation of health and safety regulations ought not to be limited in
their recovery to the inadequate awards available under workmen's
compensation. Employers should be required to pay at least the
actual economic loss suffered by the employee.6 7 Employees should
have the right to be regularly informed of the substances with
which they work or come in contact and all the known health
hazards which those substances present.6 8 Employees should not
be subject to discipline or discharge for refusing to work where
they, in good faith, believe there is substantial risk of injury to
safety and health;6 9 and an employee who has filed a claim of viola-
tion should not be subject to discipline or discharge unless the em-
ployer affirmatively proves just cause for discharge. These are but
beginning examples of how we might increase the individual's abil-
ity to protect his right to a safe and healthy workplace.
66. See, e.g., Belgium 72-75, in INMRNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 37; France 71-
73, in id.; Federal Republic of Germany 95-96, in id.; Italy 54.55, in id.; Netherlands 37, in
id.
67. See Comment, Occupational Health Risks and the Worker's Right to Know, 90
YALE L.J. 1792 (1981).
68. In Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980), the Supreme Court upheld a
regulation of the Secretary of Labor providing that under certain circumstances employees
would be protected against disciplinary action for refusing to perform hazardous work. 29
C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1980). The protection is limited, however, to situations where the
work would subject the employee to "serious injury or death." The condition must be "of
such a nature that a reasonable person ... would conclude that there is real risk of death
or serious injury, and that there is insufficient time . . . to eliminate the danger through
resort to regular statutory enforcement channels," and where possible the employee must
have also sought from his employer and been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous
condition. Id. Silver, National Labor Policy And The Conflict Between Safety and Produc-
tion, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1 (1981).
69. Requiring the employee to prove the employer's motive for discipline or discharge
places a deadening burden on the employee, particularly where the employee has no union
to help obtain evidence and present the case. The burden should be on the employer to




The fundamental premise of labor legislation is that individual
employees lack the bargaining power to protect their own inter-
ests and it is the responsibility of the law to aid them as the
weaker party. The secondary premise, articulated in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and implemented by the Wagner Act, is that the
best way for the law to fulfill that responsibility with a minimum
of government intervention is to replace individual bargaining with
collective bargaining. This would not only provide a better balance
of bargaining power, but would provide a measure of industrial de-
mocracy and individual justice.
These premises, I believe, are still compelling. The law must
aid the weaker party and this can best be done by establishing col-
lective bargaining. Our failure has been to rely on collective bar-
gaining and then neglect to establish it for seventy percent of the
work force. The law has thereby failed to fulfill its fundamental
responsibility.
The problem which we have comfortably ignored and must
now confront is how we shall extend aid and protection to this sev-
enty percent. These include those who have the most burdensome
work, who are exposed to the most unsafe workplaces, who live in
the greatest insecurity, and who are subject to the most arbitrary
treatment. Their human dignity is every day denied. We can no
longer turn our heads and pass by on the other side.
My purpose here has not been to present a program but to
urge that we begin a process. I have sketched some possibilities,
not with the conviction that they provide answers, but with the
hope that they may spur imagination. They are at most a begin-
ning toward an end.
I recognize that any such proposals these days are hopelessly
unreal; they will not likely receive even serious hearing. But we
should begin to work through such problems now, to develop a
range of responses, and to open discussion so that when the politi-
cal climate is more hospitable, we shall be prepared. Our concern is
not with a transient, but a persistent, problem and our goals are
not short run, but long run. I am well aware of the statement at-
tributed to Keynes, "In the long run we are all dead." But death is
not the end of life and the worth of the race is in the running.
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